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Mobile browsers are increasingly being relied upon to
perform security sensitive operations. Like their desktop
counterparts, these applications can enable SSL/TLS to
provide strong security guarantees for communications
over the web. However, the drastic reduction in screen
size and the accompanying reorganization of screen real
estate significantly changes the use and consistency of
the security indicators and certificate information that
alert users of site identity and the presence of strong
cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we perform the
first measurement of the state of critical security indi-
cators in mobile browsers. We evaluate ten mobile and
two tablet browsers, representing over 90% of the market
share, using the recommended guidelines for web user
interface to convey security set forth by the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C). While desktop browsers follow
the majority of guidelines, our analysis shows that mo-
bile browsers fall significantly short. We also observe no-
table inconsistencies across mobile browsers when such
mechanisms actually are implemented. Finally, we use
this evidence to argue that the combination of reduced
screen space and an independent selection of security in-
dicators not only make it difficult for experts to deter-
mine the security standing of mobile browsers, but actu-
ally make mobile browsing more dangerous for average
users as they provide a false sense of security.
1 Introduction
Mobile browsers provide a rich set of features that of-
ten rival their desktop counterparts. From support for
Javascript and access to location information to the abil-
ity for third-party applications to render content through
WebViews, browsers are beginning to serve as one of
the critical enablers of modern mobile computing. Such
functionality, in combination with the near universal
implementation of strong cryptographic tools including
SSL/TLS, allows users to become increasingly reliant
upon mobile devices to enable sensitive personal, social
and financial exchanges.
In spite of the availability of SSL/TLS, mobile users
are regularly becoming the target of malicious behavior.
A 2011 report indicates that mobile users are three times
more likely to access phishing websites than desktop
users [19]. Security indicators (i.e., certificate informa-
tion, lock icons, cipher selection, etc.) in web browsers
offer one of the few defenses against such attacks. A user
can view different security indicators and related certifi-
cate information presented by the browser to offer signals
or clues about the credibility of a website. Although mo-
bile and tablet browsers appear to support similar secu-
rity indicators when compared to desktop browsers, the
reasons behind the increasing number of attacks on mo-
bile browsers are not immediately clear.
In this paper, we perform the first comprehensive em-
pirical evaluation of security indicators in mobile web
browsers. The goal of this work is not to determine if
average users take advantage of such cues, but instead to
demonstrate that such indicators are lacking and thus fail
to provide sufficient information for even experts. We be-
lieve that this distinction is critical because it highlights
areas where not even the best trained users will be able
to differentiate between malicious and benign behavior.
Rather than an ad hoc analysis, we base our study on the
recommendations set forward by the W3C for user inter-
face security [10] as a proxy for best practices. In partic-
ular, we systematically measure which browsers strictly
conform to the absolute requirements and prohibitions of
this document. We perform our analysis across ten mo-
bile and two tablet browsers, representing greater than
90% of the mobile market share [15], and then com-
pare our results against the five most popular desktop
browsers.
Our study makes the following contributions:
• Widespread failure to implement recommended
security indicators in mobile browsers: We
perform the first systematic and comprehensive
comparison between mobile, tablet and traditional
browsers based on the best practices set forth in the
W3C guidelines [10]. Whereas desktop browsers
largely conform to these guidelines, mobile and
tablet browsers fail to do so in numerous instances.
We believe that this makes even expert users sub-
ject to attacks including an undetectable man-in-
the-middle.
• Mobile security indicators are implemented in-
consistently across browsers: Our study ob-
served tremendous inconsistency in the presentation
and availability of such indicators in mobile and
tablet browsers, in contrast to traditional desktop
browsers. Accordingly, many of the clues experts
instruct average users to look for can no longer reli-
ably be found on these platforms.
• Newest security indicator is largely absent: Ex-
tended Validation (EV) SSL indicators and certifi-
cates [9,28,35] were designed to improve assurance
of the identity of the certificate holder. While this
mechanism is not a requirement of the W3C recom-
mendations, its use is pervasive in desktop browsers
and virtually non-existent in mobile browsers. Mo-
bile users are therefore unable to determine if cer-
tificates have undergone so-called extended valida-
tion, and sites using these certificates may be un-
able to justify their significant monetary investment
in them.
Our measurements and observations from examining
the most widely used mobile browsers lead us to make
a number of bold assertions which we expect will be
viewed as controversial, and thus worthy of discussion
within the community. (1) Browser designers have been
forced by the dramatic reduction in screen space to sac-
rifice a number of visual security features. The deter-
mination of which features are the most useful appears
to have been by independent processes, as reflected in
the different subsets of security indicators implemented
across the mobile platforms. (2) Previous studies have
overwhelmingly demonstrated that average users simply
do not understand security indicators even on desktop
browsers [22–24, 26, 37, 39]. Our measurements demon-
strate that the display of security indicators on mobile
platforms are considerably worse, to the extent that we as
experts cannot express confidence in having sufficient in-
formation to take proper decisions. Consequently, we as-
sert that the role of security indicators in mobile browsers
offers little more than a false sense of security. The
security user interface must therefore either be dramat-
ically improved, to provide indicators of demonstrable
use, or should be considerably simplified, to remove un-
usable, unreliable, or misleading artifacts. (3) We argue
that the current practice of repeatedly forcing a user-base
that is largely security un-savvy to make subtle security
decisions is a losing game. Minor tweaks to the word-
ings of certificate interface dialogues, for example, may
reach a slightly higher local maxima in terms of secu-
rity improvements, but are highly unlikely to attain a
more global maxima offering demonstrably better secu-
rity. Given the real estate constraints of the increasingly
dominant mobile platforms, our evidence shows that this
current practice has actually resulted in a decrease in
overall security signaling. Consequently, we raise ques-
tions not only about the viability of Extended Validation
(EV) SSL certificates, but about the ongoing viability of
SSL indicators themselves due to the inability to convey
accurate, reliable information to users as necessary for
subtle security decisions.
For these reasons, we believe that a measurement
study as reported in the current paper is a requisite first
step for our community to address these difficult issues
and deal with these problems head-on.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 explains the mandatory elements of the W3C
guidelines; Section 3 provides the primary results of our
evaluation; Section 4 presents ways in that a user can be
misled about the identity of a website or the use of en-
cryption and attacks that are enabled by this confusion;
Section 5 discusses the presence of EV-SSL, the newest
security indicator; Section 6 provides a discussion of our
findings; Section 7 presents an overview of related re-
search; and Section 8 offers concluding remarks.
2 Background on W3C Recommendations
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has defined
user interface guidelines [10] for the presentation and
communication of web security context information to
end-users of both desktop and mobile browsers. We pro-
vide a brief explanation of the W3C guidelines refer-
enced within this paper. For clarity of terminology used
in the guidelines and the later sections, we encourage
readers to refer to the definitions provided in the Ap-
pendix A.1.
We chose a subset of the absolute requirements
(MUST) and prohibitions (MUST NOT) specified in the
W3C user interface guidelines.1 We omitted the guide-
lines represented by clauses including the MAY, MAY
NOT, SHOULD and SHOULD NOT keywords as they
represent the optional guidelines [3]. We classify the
1The guidelines deemed to be the most critical, definitively testable
and enabling attacks when violated were selected based on the authors’
experience and knowledge of the area of SSL indicators.
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Category Browser Name Version Rendering Engine Operating System Device
Mobile
Android 2.3.3 Webkit Android 2.3.3 Nexus One
Blackberry 5.0.0 Mango Blackberry OS 5.0.0.732 Bold 9650
Blackberry 6.0.0 Webkit Blackberry OS 6 Torch 9800
Chrome Beta 0.16.4130.199 Webkit Android 4.0.3 Nexus S
Firefox Mobile 4 Beta 3 Gecko Android 2.3.3 Nexus One
Internet Explorer * Trident Windows Phone LG-C900Mobile 7.0.7004.0 OS
Nokia Browser 7.4.2.6 Webkit Symbian Belle Nokia 701
Opera Mini 6.0.24556 Presto Android 2.3.3 Nexus One5.0.019802 Presto iOS 4.1 (8B117) iPhone
Opera Mobile 11.00 Presto Android 2.3.3 Nexus One
Safari * Webkit iOS 4.1 (8B117) iPhone
Tablet Android * Webkit Android 3.1 Samsung GalaxySafari * Webkit iOS 4.3.5 (8L1) iPad 2
Desktop
Chrome 15.0.874.106 Webkit OS X 10.6.8 –
Firefox 7.0.1 Gecko OS X 10.6.8 –
Internet Explorer 8.0.7600.16385 Trident Windows 7 –
Opera 11.52 Presto OS X 10.6.8 –
Safari 5.1.1 Webkit OS X 10.6.8 –
Table 1: Details of the browsers used for experimental evaluation. We selected Android browser version 2.3.3 since it
has the highest market share among the available Android platforms [17]. (*: The version numbers of these browsers
were not apparent. We have used the default browsers shipped with the referenced version of the OS.)
W3C guidelines into five categories: identity signal, cer-
tificates, TLS indicators, robustness and error messages.
1) Identity signal: availability:
The security indicators showing identity of a website
MUST be available to the user either through the
primary or the secondary interface at all times.
2) Certificates: required content:
In addition to the identity signal, the web browsers
MUST make the following security context information
available through information sources (certificates):
the webpage’s domain name and the reason why the
displayed information is trusted (or not).
3) TLS indicators:
a) Significance of presence: Any UI indicator (such
as the padlock) MUST NOT signal the presence of a
certificate unless all parts of the webpage are loaded
from servers presenting at least validated certificates over
strongly TLS-protected interactions.
b) Content and Indicator Proximity: Content MUST
NOT be displayed in a manner that confuses hosted con-
tent and browser chrome2 indicators, by allowing that
content to mimic chrome indicators in a position close
to them.
c) Availability: The TLS indicators MUST be available
to the user through the primary or the secondary inter-
2A browser chrome refers to the graphical elements of a web
browser that do not include web content.
face at all times.
4) Robustness: visibility of indicators:
Web content MUST NOT obscure the security user
interface.
5) Error messages:
a) Interruption: Both warning/caution and danger mes-
sages MUST interrupt the user’s current task, such that
the user has to acknowledge the message.
b) Proceeding options: Warning/caution messages
MUST provide the user with distinct options for how to
proceed (i.e., these messages MUST NOT lead to a situ-
ation in which the only option presented to the user is to
dismiss the warning and continue).
c) Inhibit interaction: The interactions for danger mes-
sages MUST be presented in a way that makes it impos-
sible for the user to go to or interact with the destination
website that caused the danger situation to occur, without
first explicitly interacting with the danger message.
3 Empirical Observations
We evaluate ten mobile and two tablet browsers against
the W3C recommended practices for security indicators.
The details of the browsers are provided in Table 1. For
each of the guidelines described in Section 2, we cre-
ate and run a set of experiments to verify compliance on
all the candidate browsers and record our observations.
All the experiments were performed on web browsers on
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Mobile and Tablet 1) Identity signal: availability 2) Certificates: required content
Browsers Owner information Certificate issuer’s Domain name Information on why certificate
(See Table 1 for versions) available? information available? available? trusted available?
Android · · · ×
Blackberry Mango · · · ·
Blackberry Webkit · · · ·
Chrome Beta · · · ×
Firefox Mobile · · · ×
iPhone Safari × × × ×
Nokia Browser · · · ×
Opera Mini × × × ×
Opera Mobile × × × ×
Windows IE Mobile × × × ×
Safari on iPad 2 × × × ×
Android on Galaxy · · · ×
Table 2: Results of experiments on candidate mobile browsers to test compliance with the first two W3C guidelines
given in Section 2. Each guideline column consists of sub-columns stating the experiments performed on the browsers.
A × implies that the browser does not comply with the respective W3C guideline. A · implies that the browser
complies with the respective W3C guideline. Note that all the desktop browsers are compliant to the same guidelines.
real mobile phones, and are recreated in the respective
emulators to generate many of the figures throughout the
paper. The browser versions used in our evaluation are
approximately the latest as of February 12th, 2012. Ta-
bles 2 through 6 provide the synopsis of the results of our
experiments.
3.1 Identity Signal: Availability
An identity signal contains information about the owner
of a website and the corresponding certificate issuer. Be-
fore issuing a certificate, the certificate provider requests
the contact email address for the website from a pub-
lic domain name registrar, and checks that published ad-
dress against the email address supplied in the certificate
request. Therefore, the owner of a website is someone
in contact with the person who registered the domain
name. Popular browsers represent the owner informa-
tion of a website using different terminology including
owner, subject, holder and organization.
We visited a public webpage presenting a trusted
root certificate from all the candidate browsers. We
then evaluated the browsers for the presence of identity
signal, either on the primary or the secondary interface.
Observations: The IE Mobile, iPhone and iPad Safari,
and Opera Mini and Mobile browsers do not provide a
user interface to view certificates. Accordingly, none of
these five browsers comply with the W3C recommenda-
tions We note that when a website presents a certificate
that is from a CA not from a trusted root, all the browsers
provide an interface to view the certificate via an error
message. The Android mobile and tablet, Blackberry
Mango and Webkit, Chrome Beta and Nokia browsers
always allow a user to view certificates (both trusted and
untrusted) and therefore comply with this guideline. A
user is required to click the lock icon to view certificate
information on the Chrome Beta and Blackberry Mango
browsers. However, the browsers do not provide any vi-
sual indication to the user about this process of accessing
the certificate information. Browsers supporting a UI for
viewing certificate information provide a clear indication
in the “options” in the browser menu. Although the Fire-
fox Mobile browser does not support a certificate UI, it
displays the identity information of a website when the
site identity button is clicked. All desktop browsers com-
ply with this guideline. Table 2 provides the summary of
our results.
3.2 Certificates: Required Content
In addition to the identity signal content, a certificate
from a website must provide the same website’s domain
name and the reason why the displayed information is
trusted (or not). Trust reasons include whether or not
a certificate was accepted interactively, whether a self-
signed certificate was used, whether the self-signed cer-
tificate was pinned to the site that the user interacts with,
and whether trust relevant settings of the user agent were
otherwise overridden through user action. We believe
that information such as “certificate is implicitly trusted”
and “the certificate chain is trusted/valid” also conveys
the reason behind a browser trusting or not trusting a par-
ticular website.
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We analyzed the candidate browsers for the presence
of the required certificate content by visiting a web-
site that uses strongly TLS-protected connection with its
clients.
Observations: The IE Mobile, iPhone and iPad Sa-
fari, and Opera Mini and Mobile browsers do not pro-
vide a user interface to view certificates from trusted
CAs. Therefore, these browsers fail to meet the W3C
guideline. Additionally, even though the remaining mo-
bile and tablet browsers provide a user interface to view
certificate information, they do not provide an explana-
tion on why a particular certificate is trusted. Only the
Blackberry Mango and Webkit browsers comply with the
guideline by making all the required parts of a certificate
available. When a website presents a certificate from a
trusted CA, the Blackberry Mango and Webkit browsers
show the reason “certificate is implicitly trusted”. There-
fore, all but two mobile and tablet browsers fail to meet
this W3C guideline. All desktop browsers follow this
guideline correctly. Table 2 provides the summary of our
results.
3.3 TLS Indicators
TLS indicators include the https prefix, the padlock
icon, information about the ciphers used in the connec-
tion and URL coloring (or site identity button) to depict
the difference between EV-SSL and SSL certified web-
pages.
a) Significance of presence: If a web browser displays a
TLS indicator for the presence of a certificate for a web-
page consisting of content obtained over both http and
https connections (mixed content), this guideline is not
followed.
We created a simple webpage that uses a strong TLS
connection to retrieve the top-level resource and embed-
ded a map obtained from a third-party over an unsecured
http connection. We rendered this webpage on the can-
didate browsers and analyzed the browsers for the pres-
ence of two basic TLS security indicators: the https
URL prefix and the padlock icon. If a browser shows
any of these two indicators on a mixed content webpage,
it does not follow the W3C guideline.
Observations: The Blackberry Mango, Blackberry We-
bkit and IE Mobile browsers display a lock icon on a
webpage holding mixed content, thus failing to meet the
W3C guideline. The Blackberry Webkit and IE Mo-
bile browsers display a mixed-content warning and, if
the user proceeds to the webpage, a lock icon is dis-
played. The Android browsers on the mobile and tablet
devices present an open lock with a question mark inside
the lock. The Chrome Beta browser displays a closed
lock with a cross on top and a striked through https
URL prefix for a mixed content webpage. This behav-
ior of Android and Chrome is inconsistent with the other
browsers. Therefore, it is necessary for the users of these
browsers to understand the meaning of the new symbols
in order to interpret its reference to mixed content on a
webpage.
All browsers display the https URL prefix either
on the primary or the secondary interface. We note that
this issue is present even in popular desktop browsers.
The behavior of displaying the https URL prefix on a
mixed content webpage fails to meet the W3C recom-
mendation in both the desktop and mobile environments
as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
b) Content and Indicator Proximity: The padlock icon
used as a security indicator and the favicon used as an
identity element of a website are two popular elements
that use a browser’s chrome. If a browser allows a fav-
icon to be placed next to the padlock, an attacker can
feign a secure website by mimicking the favicon as a se-
curity indicator. We evaluated this scenario by visiting a
webpage over a strong TLS connection from all candi-
date browsers and observing the relative locations of the
favicon and padlock.
Observations: The Android mobile browser does not
follow the W3C guideline. The browser places the fav-
icon of a webpage beside the padlock icon. All other
browsers adhere to this guideline, as shown in Tables 3
and 4.
We observed several inconsistencies in the use and po-
sition of the padlock icon and the favicon in the mobile
and tablet browsers. As shown in Figure 1, the favi-
con is displayed only on the Android (mobile and tablet),
Blackberry Webkit and Firefox Mobile browsers. The re-
maining mobile and tablet browsers never display a favi-
con. This behavior is inconsistent with desktop browsers.
We believe lack of screen space to be one of the drivers
behind the removal of the favicon from the mobile en-
vironment. In addition to the almost total lack of use of
favicons, we also noticed that the position of the padlock
icon in mobile browsers is inconsistent across different
mobile browsers. In the past, researchers have shown
that the padlock icon is the security indicator most often
noticed by users [24, 39]. Traditional desktop browsers
generally display the padlock icon in the address bar.
However, all mobile and tablet browsers except Android
(mobile and tablet), Blackberry Webkit, Chrome Beta
and IE Mobile browsers display the lock icon on the title
bar instead of the address bar. We believe that the reason
behind this shift of location of the padlock icon in the
mobile and tablet browsers is the non-persistent avail-
ability of the address bar to the user. Whenever a user
starts interacting with a webpage, most mobile browsers
hide the address bar to accommodate more content on the
small screen.
c) Availability: We studied the presence of the lock icon,
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Mobile and Tablet TLS indicators
Browsers 3a) significance of presence 3b) position 3c) availability
(See Table 1 for versions) Mixed content: Mixed content: Favicon not next https prefix Lock shown? Cipher details
no lock shown? no https shown? to lock icon? available? available?
Android Open lock with × × ·(s) · ×
a question mark
Blackberry Mango × × · ·(s) · ·
Blackberry Webkit × × · ·(s) · ·
Chrome Beta Closed lock with https striked · ·(s) · ·
a cross on top through
Firefox Mobile No security × · ·(s) · On clicking the ×
indicators shown site identity button
iPhone Safari · × · ·(s) · ×
Nokia Browser · × · ·(s) · ×
Opera Mini · × · ·(s) · ×
Opera Mobile · × · ·(s) · ×
Windows IE Mobile × × · ·(s) · ×
Safari on iPad 2 · × · ·(s) · ×
Android on Galaxy Open lock with × · ·(s) · ×
a question mark
Table 3: Results of experiments on candidate mobile browsers to test compliance with the W3C guidelines 3a, 3b, and
3c given in Section 2. The symbol notation is as defined in Table 2. ‘s’: Implies that the https URL prefix is present
on the ‘s’econdary interface.
Desktop Browsers TLS indicators
(See Table 1 3a) significance of presence 3b) position 3c) availability
for versions) Mixed content: Mixed content: Favicon not next https prefix Lock shown? Cipher details
no lock shown? no https shown? to lock icon? available? available?
Chrome Lock with a × · ·(p) · ·
yellow triangle
Firefox · × · ·(p) · On clicking the
site identity button ·
IE · × · ·(p) · ×
Opera · × · ·(p) · ·
Safari · × · ·(p) · ×
Table 4: Results of experiments on desktop browsers to test compliance with the guidelines in Table 3. The symbol
notation is as defined in Table 2. ‘p’: Implies that the https URL prefix is present on the ‘p’rimary interface.
the https URL prefix and details of the cipher used in
a TLS connection by visiting a TLS protected webpage
using all candidate browsers. The padlock icon and the
https URL prefix are primary interface indicators and
cipher information is a secondary interface indicator on
desktop browsers.
Observations: Websites handling sensitive digital trans-
actions (such as banks) ask users to search for the
https URL prefix to ensure security of their transac-
tions. Therefore, easy access to the https URL pre-
fix is important. This indicator is present in the address
bar (primary interface) of desktop browsers and is clearly
visible to the user at all times. Among the mobile and
tablet browsers, all but the Blackberry Mango browser
display the https URL prefix in the address bar. The
Blackberry Mango browser does not have an address bar
and provides a choice to view the webpage’s URL from
the browser’s options. This setting requires a user to be
knowledgeable of the change to be able to find the URL
of the current webpage and also makes the https URL
prefix a secondary interface indicator. Although the other
mobile browsers display the https URL prefix in the
address bar, they hide the address bar (except Chrome
Beta) for better usability. In the Chrome Beta browser,
if the URL of a webpage is longer than the screen size,
the https URL prefix is hidden. Since a user is re-
quired to interact with the address bar to view the URL
prefix of a webpage, the https URL prefix becomes
a secondary interface indicator in all mobile and tablet
browsers. This increases the likelihood of a successful
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Android Mobile Blackberry Mango Blackberry Webkit
Chrome Beta Firefox Mobile Internet Explorer Mobile
Nokia Browser Opera Mini Opera Mobile
iPhone Safari Safari TabletAndroid Tablet
Figure 1: Security indicators on the primary interface (address bar) of all the mobile and tablet browsers. Every
browser has three screenshots of the address bar: from top to bottom, the websites are Google over an http connec-
tion, Gmail over a secure connection with an SSL certificate and Bank of America over a secure connection with an
EV-SSL certificate.
downgrade attack (e.g., SSLstrip [7] attack) on the mo-
bile and tablet browsers, since a user requires effort to
view the https URL prefix.
The information about the ciphers used in setting up
the TLS connection between a website server and the
user’s browser is not available in any of the browsers ex-
cept Blackberry Mango and Webkit and Chrome Beta.
Accordingly, all the mobile and tablet browsers except
three do not comply this W3C guideline for our exper-
iments. Tables 3 and 4 provide the summary of our re-
sults.
3.4 Robustness: Visibility of Indicators
The TLS indicators generally found on the primary
interface are lock icon, https URL prefix, URL
coloring and site identity button. Typically, the address
bar in a web browser holds these indicators. Therefore,
we examined whether web content overwrites or pushes
the address bar containing security indicators out of a
user’s view during browsing.
Observations: Presumably, in order to free up screen
real estate for other purposes, the address bar on all
but two mobile and tablet browsers is overwritten by
web content once a webpage is rendered and/or when
a user starts interacting with the page. The IE Mobile
browser always displays the address bar in the portrait
view. However, the address bar is never displayed in
IE Mobile when a user interacts with a webpage in the
landscape mode. The Chrome beta browser makes the
address bar persistently available in both the portrait and
landscape modes. Out of the two tablet browsers, only
the tablet Safari browser avoids the security indicators
on the address bar being overwritten by a webpage’s con-
tent, therefore allowing a persistent view of the security
indicators on the primary interface. The Android tablet
browser hides the address bar once a webpage is ren-
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Mobile and Tablet 4) Robustness 5) Error messages
Browsers Content does not 5a) Interruption 5b) Proceeding options 5c) Inhibit interaction
(See Table 1 for versions) obscure indicators Warning Danger (for warnings) (for danger
on the address bar? (mixed content) (self-signed cert) messages)
Android × ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Blackberry Mango NA ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Blackberry Webkit × · · “Continue, Close connection, ·
View cert, Trust cert” options
Chrome Beta · ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Firefox Mobile × ×∗ · NA∗ ·
iPhone Safari × ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Nokia Browser × · · · ·
Opera Mini × ×∗ × NA∗ ×
Opera Mobile × ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Windows IE Mobile × · · “Yes and No” ·
options
Safari on iPad 2 · ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Android on Galaxy × · · “Continue, View Certificate, ·
Go Back” options
Table 5: Results of experiments on mobile and tablet browsers to test compliance with the W3C guidelines 4, 5a, 5b
and 5c given in Section 2. The symbol notation is as defined in Table 2. NA: Implies that the concerned experiment is
not applicable to that browser, the reasoning can be found in the text. (*: Our view is that a browser should display a
warning message for a webpage holding mixed content, to avoid misleading users trained to interpret SSL indicators
to mean that the (entire) webpage is secured.) ×∗: Implies that the browser fails to warn a user according to our view.
Desktop Browsers 4) Robustness 5) Error messages
(See Table 1 for versions) Content does not 5a) Interruption 5b) Proceeding options 5c) Inhibit interaction
obscure indicators Warning Danger (for warnings) (for danger
on the address bar? (mixed content) (self-signed cert) messages)
Chrome · ×∗ · NA∗ ·
site identity button
shows a warning
Firefox · ×∗ · NA∗ ·
IE · · · “Yes, No” ·
More info options
Opera · ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Safari · ×∗ · NA∗ ·
Table 6: Results of experiments on desktop browsers to test compliance with the same guidelines as Table 5. The
symbol notation is as defined in Table 2 and Table 5.
dered. Tables 5 and 6 show that all the candidate desk-
top browsers follow this guideline unlike the mobile and
tablet browsers.
3.5 Error Messages
We created example scenarios that demand the warn-
ing/caution and danger messages, given the definitions
in the W3C document. The W3C document provides ex-
amples of scenarios that demand a danger alert. How-
ever, as the document does not specify any scenarios that
should trigger warnings, we carried out our tests using
the following scenario.
We classified the scenario of a browser rendering a
mixed content webpage as one that should trigger a
warning. This is because on a webpage with both inse-
cure and secure content, the user may or may not interact
with the insecure content on the webpage. Therefore,
the browser system is unable to positively determine
whether the user is at risk. In contrast, we used an
example scenario given in the W3C document for our
experiments on danger messages. The W3C document
defines ‘rendering a webpage presenting a self-signed
certificate’ as one that should trigger a danger message,
since the certificate is not from a trusted root.
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a) Interruption: We examined whether the mobile and
tablet browsers display a warning or danger message in
our example scenarios. We further observed the nature
of the messages to confirm that they actually interrupt the
user’s actions as specified by the W3C guidelines and are
not displayed at a position on the screen which a user can
ignore and continue interacting with the website.
Observations: Only four mobile and tablet browsers
(Android tablet, Blackberry Webkit, IE Mobile and
Nokia) interrupt the user by displaying a warning about
the existence of insecure content on a mixed content
webpage, before the webpage is rendered. The other
browsers do not interrupt the user by displaying a warn-
ing. The iPhone Safari browser shows a mixed content
warning on a console that needs to be enabled by a user
and is intended for developers. We believe that most
iPhone Safari users are unlikely to enable the debug con-
sole, carefully browse the debug messages and therefore
understand the presence of mixed content. The Chrome
Beta browser shows a warning about mixed content when
the crossed padlock in the address bar is clicked. Among
the desktop browsers, only IE displays a mixed content
warning, thereby interrupting a user.
All but one of the mobile and tablet browsers comply
with the interruption guideline by displaying a danger
message, when a webpage with a self-signed certificate
is rendered. The Opera Mini browser is the only browser
that does not display a danger message in this scenario;
it simply renders the webpage and does not show any
TLS indicators.
b) Proceeding options: We examined whether the warn-
ing message displayed for a mixed content webpage pro-
vides a user with more than one option to proceed after
interruption.
Observations: Only the Android tablet, Blackberry
Webkit, IE Mobile and Nokia browsers display a
warning message when navigated to a mixed content
webpage. The IE Mobile browser informs the user
about the presence of unsecured content on the webpage
and provides two options for continuing: <Yes, No>.
However, there is no option to the user to view the
certificate provided by the top-level website using a
secured connection. Conversely, the Android tablet and
Nokia browsers provide an option to view a website’s
certificate. The options presented by the Android tablet
browser are <Continue, View Certificate, Go back>,
where the “Go back” option navigates the user to a
webpage viewed right before the mixed content web-
page. The options provided by the Nokia browser are
<Accept this time only, Accept permanently, Certificate
details>. The Blackberry Webkit browser provides
the options to <Continue, Close Connection (default),
View Certificate, Trust Certificate>. Among the desktop
browsers, IE provides <Yes, No, More info> options to
proceed when a mixed content webpage is rendered.
c) Inhibit interaction: This guideline requires a browser
to prevent a user from interacting with a website that trig-
gers a danger message, before user interaction with the
danger message. We visited a website presenting an un-
trusted self-signed certificate from all the browsers.
Observations: All mobile and tablet browsers except
Opera Mini display a danger message on receiving a self-
signed certificate. Additionally, they restrict a user’s in-
teraction to the danger message. A user is unable to
access the website content before explicitly interacting
with the danger message. The Opera Mini browser does
not show an error for self-signed certificates. It simply
routes the user to the webpage presenting the self-signed
certificate. The Chrome Beta browser displays a cross
on the https URL prefix and the padlock icon even af-
ter a webpage with a danger message is loaded following
user interaction. All desktop browsers correctly follow
this guideline. Table 5 and Table 6 summarize our exper-
imental results of the error message guidelines.
We discuss additional findings that are not directly re-
lated to the guidelines studied in this section in the Ap-
pendix A.2.
4 User Deception and Potential Attacks
The W3C user interface guidelines, which we use as a
proxy for best practice, are an effort to communicate se-
curity information to users such that they can make in-
formed decisions about websites that they visit. If these
guidelines are not implemented by a browser, users are
more easily misled about the identity of a website or the
security of a connection. We discuss four attacks that are
enabled on browsers violating one or more of the W3C
guidelines. Table 7 provides a summary of potential at-
tacks described in this section on the candidate browsers.
i) Phishing without SSL: An attacker masquerades as a
trustworthy entity in a phishing attack. By closely imitat-
ing a legitimate website’s identity information in combi-
nation with lock icon spoofing, a malicious website can
launch a phishing attack without SSL on a browser vio-
lating the W3C guidelines 1, 2 and 3b as follows.
An attacker buys a domain name that
closely resembles the domain name of the
legitimate website. For example, to spoof
www.bankofamerica.com, the attacker buys
the domain name www.bankofamericaa.com.
The attacker then imitates the content of the targeted
legitimate website. Instead of spending money on
purchasing an SSL certificate to increase the “false”
credibility of the malicious website, an attacker instead





























































Phishing without SSL × · · · · · · · · · · ·
Phishing with SSL · × · · · × · × × × × ·
Phishing using a · × · · · × · × × × × ·
compromised CA
Industrial espionage/ × × × × × × × × × × × ×
Eavesdropping
Table 7: Summary of potential attacks on candidate mobile browsers. A × implies that the attack is possible. A ·
implies that the corresponding attack is not possible on the browser.
Therefore, the closely imitated domain name provides
an impression of correct identity of the intended website
and the spoofed lock provides an illusion of strong
encryption.
When this malicious website is rendered in a browser
that makes viewing the URL of the website difficult, sit-
uates the favicon next to the padlock icon and does not
offer a UI to view identity information such as website
owner’s name, even an advanced user might be subjected
to phishing.
ii) Phishing with SSL: Spoofing only the lock icon may
not be adequate to launch a successful phishing attack.
To increase the credibility of a phishing website, the at-
tacker can buy an inexpensive SSL certificate for the
website. The presence of a valid certificate causes a
browser to display SSL indicators such as the https
URL prefix and URL coloring (or colored site identity
button) in addition to the lock icon in the browser’s
chrome. If a user blindly trusts just these SSL indica-
tors and can not verify additional identity information of
the website (violation of guideline 1 and 2), he can be
subjected to a phishing attack.
iii) Phishing using a compromised CA: Compromis-
ing a CA allows an attacker to obtain rogue certificates
for legitimate websites. There have been several such at-
tacks recently [13, 14]. If a user’s browser trusts a CA,
the browser will accept all certificates signed by the CA
without showing any warning to the user. This behav-
ior persists even when the same CA is compromised and
the necessary update to remove the trusted CA from the
browser has not been installed. An expert user who is
knowledgeable of a CA compromise can verify every
certificate issuer’s organization in the certificate chain,
therefore declining interacting with a malicious website
with a rogue certificate. If a browser fails to meet guide-
lines 1 and 2, thereby not presenting user interface to
enable certificate viewing, even an expert user could be
exposed to a phishing attack.
iv) Industrial espionage / eavesdropping: A man-in-
the-middle (network) attacker can use any one of the ci-
pher downgrade, substituting http for https or in-
serting mixed content techniques for user deception to
launch an eavesdropping attack on a user’s session as fol-
lows:
SSLstrip attack: The SSLstrip [7] man-in-the-middle
attacker sits on a local network and intercepts traffic.
When the attacker detects a request to an encrypted
https site, he substitutes a duplicate of the intended
destination as an unencrypted http site. This switching
strips away the security that prevents a third party from
stealing or modifying data, while deceiving the server
that an encrypted page has been sent to the client. The
network attacker can also fake a lock icon in the stripped
http page, by replacing the favicon by a lock icon [30].
If the https prefix is not available to a user persistently,
he may not be able to recognize that he is using an unse-
cured connection by noticing the change from https to
http in the address bar. A browser not displaying the
https prefix persistently does not follow requirement
3c in Section 2.
Cipher downgrade attack: A man-in-the-middle (net-
work attacker) can tamper with the initial messages sent
by a client browser to establish an SSL connection with
a website server. Before a TLS connection is set up, a
client and server exchange a list of ciphers that they sup-
port. A network attacker can modify the list of supported
ciphers sent by the client to a list containing only weak
ciphers, and then forward the client’s request/response
to the server. On receiving a list of only weak ciphers
(e.g., DES-CBC-SHA), the server can either drop the
connection because no ciphers are mutually supported,
or provide support for that cipher and begin an encrypted
session with the weak cipher. When a connection using
the weak cipher is initiated, all the data in transit is pro-
tected using the weak cipher’s encryption scheme. This
allows a network attacker to capture the stream of data
and break the weak encryption offline. The attack is also
useful to mislead even an expert user that their transac-
tions are over a connection with strong encryption algo-
rithms, since the SSL indicators such as https URL
prefix and lock icon are present even for a connection
using a weak cipher. If a browser does not display cipher






























































EV-SSL v/s SSL × × × × · · × × × × · ×
differentiation
Table 8: Results of whether browsers differentiate between EV-SSL and SSL certified webpages. A × implies that the
browser does not provide differentiating indicators and a · implies the presence of such indicators in the browser.
Mixed content attack: A man-in-the-middle attacker
can tamper (e.g., code injection) with the unencrypted
content present on a webpage consisting of mixed con-
tent and replace the original content with any malicious
content of his choice. If a web browser displays SSL in-
dicators for a webpage containing mixed content (viola-
tion of guideline 3a), even an expert user may be unable
to detect a network attack exploiting the mixed content
on a webpage.
The results of our experiments combined with this
threat model make the candidate mobile and tablet
browsers susceptible to phishing and eavesdropping at-
tacks as shown in Table 7.
5 Inadequate EV-SSL Differentiation
The W3C guidelines do not establish recommendations
for the browser user interface to signify the difference
between EV-SSL [9, 35] and SSL certificates. The sole
distinction between an SSL and an EV-SSL certificate
from a user’s perspective is the set of indicators on his
browser. For example, the Firefox desktop browser uses
a green site identity button to convey the presence of an
EV-SSL certificate on a website. However, the site iden-
tity button is blue in the same browser when a website
with an SSL certificate is rendered.
SSL certificates can be ‘domain-validation-only’ with
minimal verification performed on the details of the cer-
tificate. Since any successful SSL connection causes the
padlock icon to appear, users are not likely to be aware
of whether the website owner has been validated or not.
Therefore, fraudulent websites have started using inex-
pensive domain-validated SSL certificates with minimal
verification to gain user trust. EV-SSL certificates were
created to restore confidence among users that a partic-
ular website owner has been subjected to more rigor-
ous vetting than simply determining control of a domain
name [38]. If browsers do not differentiate between SSL
and EV-SSL certificates, then the fundamental motiva-
tion [9] behind EV-SSL certificates becomes void. So too
does the incentive for site owners to pay extra for such
certificates – an SSL certificate from Go Daddy costs
$12.99/year [1] and an EV-SSL certificate from VeriSign
costs $1499/year [2]. In a browser with no differentiation
between SSL and EV-SSL, both these certificates appear
the same from a user’s perspective. An adversary hold-
ing a domain name and willing to spend money for the
SSL certificate would then trigger exactly the same user
interface elements to users, and thus appear to provide
identical guarantees as a website certified by the more
expensive certificate.
Experimental observations: We browsed both EV-
SSL and SSL certified webpages using all the candidate
browsers. With the exceptions of the Firefox Mobile and
the iPhone and iPad Safari browsers, none of the mobile
or tablet browsers display any indicators that differenti-
ate between EV-SSL and SSL certified webpages. The
Firefox Mobile browser changes the site identity but-
ton green or blue to depict the presence of EV-SSL and
SSL certified webpages respectively. The Safari mobile
and tablet browsers use green and blue coloring of the
‘title’ to represent the difference between EV-SSL and
SSL. This behavior of the Firefox Mobile and the Sa-
fari browsers is consistent with their desktop counter-
parts. All tested desktop browsers indicate the difference
between these two certificate types. Table 8 provides a
summary of the results.
We note the following advice within official guidelines
from the CA/Browser Forum [6]:
In cases where the relying application accepts both EV
and non-EV certificates, it is recommended that the ap-
plication’s behavior differ in a distinct way for each type
of certificate. Application developers should consider
the EV treatment offered by other application developers
that also recognize EV certificates and, where practical,
provide consistent treatment.
We assert that much more specific advice is essen-
tial, for example, in a revision or extension of the
W3C user interface guidelines [10] and potentially in the
CA/Browser Forum’s own recommendations, as well as
in appropriate supporting standards.
6 Discussion and Implications
Having performed comprehensive measurements of se-
curity indicators in the most widely used mobile
browsers (over 90% of the market share), we now dis-
cuss what we see to be the implications. We have sepa-
rated this from our measurements to allow independent
interpretations by others.
It appears quite clear that the lack of available screen
real estate has dramatically influenced the use of secu-
rity indicators on mobile devices. Whereas traditional
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browsers have a considerably richer space budget to ac-
commodate current (and even experimental) indicators,
mobile browsers struggle to clearly show content, let
alone signals of the origin and security of the connec-
tion to that content. Our measurements suggest that
browser vendors have individually made different deci-
sions to best balance these competing demands, indepen-
dently selecting to implement different subsets of the in-
dicators in use on desktop browsers. Unfortunately, our
study also reveals that the choices made by each browser
removes signals available to users to detect, and possi-
bly avoid, specific attacks—even if only by expert users.
It is not our conclusion that implementing exactly the
same security indicators on mobile platforms is impossi-
ble from an engineering perspective; but rather, the real
estate limit of mobile phones makes unclear the means
of doing so in a manner that does not simply overwhelm
the content on small mobile screens. As an example and
as shown in Figure 1, adding the https indicator to the
address bar on the primary interface would make the vast
majority of the URLs even less readable.
Moreover, even if possible, it is entirely unclear that
duplicating all desktop security indicators on mobile
browsers is the best course of action to pursue. Studies
over the last decade have repeatedly shown that average
users either ignore or do not understand browser secu-
rity indicators [22–24, 26, 37, 39]. While usability and
HCI experts have contributed to some improvements, the
community appears to be at a stalemate, lacking new
ideas—even across 10 mobile browsers—to improve (or
even retain) security signaling while preserving usabil-
ity. For example, wording and sequencing of warning
dialogs has arguably been improved, but such changes
are minor enhancements at best—and appear to move us
at best to local maxima, constrained by the current set of
indicators and the SSL security framework, while higher
global maxima seem beyond reach.
Given these observations, our work reaches the fol-
lowing logical conundrum: Mobile browsers are cur-
rently vulnerable to attacks that could potentially be ame-
liorated by implementing known security indicators at
least as well as on desktops. These indicators have
not been implemented due to space constraints. More-
over, were these indicators to be implemented on mo-
bile browsers (likely at the expense of page content), it is
entirely unclear that users would profitably notice them.
Accordingly, our community faces a difficult question:
Should mobile browsers vendors continue to
include only a subset of indicators and provide
a false sense of security to even expert users, or
implement the full corpus of indicators (which
past studies indicate users will largely ignore)
at the risk of drastically reducing the usability
of these applications?
Answering this question invokes a discussion of the
limits an SSL security framework, based on third-party
certificates, with trust deriving from a combination of
browser configuration data and user input. A key as-
sumption is that users can be provided with sufficient
interface cues (e.g., regarding the origin and algorithms
used to exchange sensitive content) and then take correct
security actions based thereon. However, as the cited
studies (and others) indicate, the largely security un-
savvy average user cannot perform this task. Presented
with subtle streams of information, users cannot realis-
tically be expected to sort out differences between cryp-
tographic algorithms, nor proper responses to increasing
incidents of CA compromise [13, 14]. In short, continu-
ing to “punt” security decisions to users who, in spite of
browsing daily for the past decade have simply not be-
come security experts, is a strategy that appears no longer
to anyone’s advantage. Compounded by the screen con-
straints of mobile devices, and these devices becoming
the dominant means of end-user computing on the planet,
continuing the current approach becomes even less plau-
sible. We argue that something must change.
As a straw-man suggestion, to start conversation, we
encourage discussion of the following resolution. As
mobile users increasingly offload computationally ex-
pensive operations to “the cloud” (e.g., complex image
rendering), so too might they outsource more security
decisions. Large external organizations or specialist en-
tities are more likely to have an understanding of the cur-
rently appropriate security footing for a browser (e.g.,
sufficiently strong algorithms, websites using certificates
from bad CAs, etc.). Accordingly, the average user could
be much better served by simply receiving a single in-
dicator representing the opinion of the identity and se-
curity of the connection through one of these entities.
Desktop browsers such as Chrome are already beginning
to rely on such services to protect users from malicious
downloads and phishing websites, and other researchers
have proposed using CDNs to provide more expensive
security services (e.g., defense against heap spraying at-
tacks) [29]. Based on browser configuration, expert users
could continue to make their own decisions, perhaps
through secondary interfaces. In particular, given that
our study shows that the majority of security information
available in mobile browsers is in such secondary inter-
faces, expert users could look at a more complete set of
information than currently available, and make more in-
formed decisions themselves. This approach would both
minimize the space required for security indicators and
would potentially provide a more useful metric for users.
We do not believe that this straw-man proposal is with-
out its own issues, but rather that the community is over-
due to directly confront the (lack of) security provided
by current indicators. Our measurement study shows that
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currently, the value is clearly insufficient.
7 Related Work
TRADITIONAL BROWSER INDICATORS: Traditional
desktop browsers contain a range of security indicators
in the chrome of the browser including the lock icon,
the https URL prefix, and certificates. Several studies
have indicated that these security cues used in desktop
browsers go unnoticed [23,24,34,35,39] or are absent in
websites [36]. Although domain name mismatches be-
tween certificates and websites are observed often [38],
Sunshine et al [37] showed that users ignore TLS warn-
ings for domain name mismatches, and showed that users
ignore TLS warnings for expired certificates and un-
known CAs. Moreover, a majority do not understand
these warnings. The lock icon is the security indica-
tor most often noticed [24, 39]. However, even when
used as a security cue by users, many do not fully un-
derstand its meaning [22–24] and its absence also often
goes unnoticed [23]. Additionally, the majority of users
who rely on the lock icon remain unaware of its iden-
tity feature [23,24,26,39] and do not reliably understand
the concept of certificates [22, 23]. Indicators for newer
technologies such as EV-SSL have also been shown to be
ineffective to convey better security to the user as com-
pared to a simple SSL certificate [18, 28].
TECHNIQUES FOR BETTER INDICATORS: Several
techniques have been proposed to design better security
indicators to prevent potential attacks such as phishing
and web spoofing. Researchers have proposed better
warnings [37], more effective interface dialogues [18],
browser plugins [20], trusted path from the browser to
the human user [40] and mandatory security indica-
tors [27] to help users make correct security decisions.
Other proposed security mechanisms include disabling
JavaScript in the user browser and forcing persistent vis-
ibility of the browser’s location line [25]. Dynamic Se-
curity Skins [22] allow a remote web server to prove its
identity in a way that is easy for a human user to verify
and hard for an attacker to spoof. Finally, efforts have
been taken [6, 9, 10, 12, 16] to standardize security indi-
cators and thus minimize confusion across browsers.
MOBILE BROWSER INDICATORS: Almost all the
efforts in the area of security indicators in browsers
have been focused on desktop browsers. The increas-
ing user base of mobile web browsers and mobile e-
commerce has made mobile browsers attractive targets
for attacks [5, 8, 11, 21, 31–33]. In light of these devel-
opments and considering how the mobile browser user
interface differs from desktops, it is important to analyze
and understand the security indicators used in mobile
browsers. Although the W3C [10] guidelines consider
mobile browsers in their definitions, a large scale evalu-
ation of the state-of-the-art security indicators in mobile
browsers has not been carried out.
8 Concluding Remarks
Modern mobile browsers enable a range of sensitive op-
erations over SSL/TLS connections. Although these
browsers aim for equivalent functionality to traditional
desktops, their smaller screen size has resulted in signif-
icant changes to the presentation and availability of SSL
indicators. This paper presents the first large scale, cross-
sectional measurement of this class of applications and
compares the security indicators used in the overwhelm-
ing majority of mobile browsers to their traditional desk-
top counterparts. Our results are threefold: that mobile
browsers implement only a subset of the recommended
indicators from the desktop world thus eliminating the
opportunity for even expert users to avoid attacks such
indicators might signal, that the subset chosen across
each browser are inconsistent and that the newest indica-
tor (EV-SSL) is virtually unseen. Our measurements lead
us to the conclusion that current security indicators force
our community to either accept a false sense of security
or to argue for the complete implementation of indica-
tors (that are likely to be ignored) at the potential cost
of overwhelming content. Having presented our empiri-
cal evidence of these problems, we argue for high profile
exposure of our results within the security community.
Moreover, we offer a straw-man proposal to motivate a
call-to-arms to address mobile browser security interface
challenges, and better allow informed decisions based on
knowledge of the state-of-the-art.
The importance of mobile browsers is only increas-
ing. In particular, a growing number of the most pop-
ular mobile apps (e.g., Facebook, ESPN, BankofAmer-
ica) are simply wrappers for the mobile browser via APIs
such as WebViews. The advantage to this approach is
that it allows for a consistent user experience across vir-
tually all platforms while drastically reducing the engi-
neering effort to achieve this feat. In spite of being re-
liant on the browser, such apps provide users with none
of the traditional indicators of security offered by the
browsers. Specifically, these APIs present all of the con-
tent of the browser without any of the chrome, meaning
that all primary and secondary security interfaces are ab-
sent. If such indicators are critical to providing security
to browser users, the community must then confront the
question directly and argue decisively for their use. If
they are not, the community should instead argue to re-
move them entirely to avoid unnecessary use of precious
real-estate, user confustion and a false sense of security.
Regardless of which argument is made, the community
must face these questions head-on.
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We define the terminology used in the W3C guidelines
referenced within this paper.
User interface elements: User interface elements in
browsers are divided in two categories [10]:
• Primary User Interface: the portions of a user in-
terface that are available to users without being so-
licited by a user interaction. The primary user in-
terface elements related to security traditionally in-
clude the padlock icon, the address bar, the https
URL prefix, the favicon, and the site-identity button
or URL coloring to signify the presence of EV-SSL
and SSL certificates [9].
• Secondary User Interface: the portions of a user
interface that are available to the user after they
are solicited by a specific user interaction. The
secondary user interface elements related to secu-
rity include the security properties dialog, domain
name, owner information, verifier information,
information on why a certificate is trusted, validity
period of manually accepted certificates (self-
signed) and cipher details of an SSL connection.
Trust anchor: A trust anchor represents an authoritative
entity represented by a public key and associated data.
The public key is used to verify digital signatures and
the associated data is used to constrain the types of
information for which the trust anchor is authoritative.
Relying parties (web browsers) use trust anchors to de-
termine if digitally signed information objects are valid
by verifying digital signatures using the trust anchor’s
public key and by enforcing the constraints expressed in
the associated certificate data. Our interpretation is that
a trust anchor refers to a certificate authority (CA).
Root: A root is a trust anchor that is any certificate
authority (CA).
Trusted root: A trusted root is a CA whose public key
is a priori trusted by the browser and may certify other
keys.
Certificates: Public key certificates are widely used to
provide keying material and convey a website’s identity
information to the user. The W3C defines four types of
certificates. We provide our interpretation for the defi-
nitions of certificate types in the W3C document where
they are ambiguous. For additional information regard-
ing the commercial practice of issuing and managing
SSL certificates, please refer to the requirements defined
by the CA/Browser forum [12].
• Validated certificate: This is a public key certificate
that has been verified by chaining up to a trusted
root. Our interpretation is that a standard SSL cer-
tificate signed by a CA trusted by a browser refers
to a validated certificate.
• Augmented assurance certificate: The certificate
chain for such a certificate MUST be validated up
to a trusted root that is recognized as augmented as-
surance qualified by the user agent (user’s browser).
We interpret an EV-SSL certificate as an augmented
assurance certificate that is validated by the browser.
• Self-signed certificate and untrusted root certifi-
cate: A self-signed certificate is a certificate that is
signed by its own creator and is not a priori trusted
by a browser. Our interpretation of an untrusted root
certificate is that it refers to a certificate holding the
public key of a CA, that is signed by a CA not a
priori trusted by the user’s browser.
• Interactively accepted trust anchors or certificates:
This refers to either a CA or a website’s public key
that is accepted by a user and thereby used as a trust
anchor by the browser. Whether the trust anchor is
accepted just for the present transaction or for the
present and the future transactions depends on the
options presented to the user by the browser and
then the option chosen by the user.
When a browser receives a website certificate, the
public key therein (and the certificate) is untrusted
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unless either the certificate was previously inter-
actively accepted (for future sessions), or trust can
be derived in it transitively, through a trust chain
starting from a trust anchor (i.e., a CA key already
trusted by the browser).
Pinning: Pinning associates one or more certificates
with a specific website. The certificate provided by
the website can either be self-signed or one issued by
an untrusted root. Once a user interactively accepts
such a certificate for the first time, the browser pins the
certificate to the website. After pinning, the browser
warns users only when the same website presents a
different certificate. No warning messages are shown by
the browser if a site shows a certificate consistent with
previously pinned certificates for that site.
Identity Signal: An identity signal on a TLS-secured
webpage includes information about the owner of the
webpage and the certificate issuer’s organization. A
webpage’s certificate provides its owner information
and the issuer’s (e.g., Certificate Authority) organization.
Strong TLS: An http transaction is strongly TLS-
protected if it is TLS-protected, an https URL was
used, strong TLS algorithms were negotiated for both
confidentiality and integrity protection, and at least one
of the following conditions is true: the server used a val-
idated certificate that matches the dereferenced URI; the
server used a self-signed certificate that was pinned to
the destination; the server used a certificate chain lead-
ing to an untrusted root certificate that was pinned to the
destination.
A strong TLS algorithm implies that no version of
the TLS protocol that suffers known security flaws has
been negotiated. Therefore, versions of SSL prior to
SSLv3 MUST NOT be considered strong. Additionally,
a strong TLS algorithm must also select a cipher suite
for which key and algorithm strengths correspond to
industry practice. More information on strong and weak
TLS algorithms can be found in the W3C document [10]
and RFC 4346 [4].
Weak TLS: An http transaction is weakly TLS-
protected if it is TLS-protected, but strong TLS
protection could not be achieved for one of the following
reasons: TLS handshake used an anonymous key ex-
change algorithm, such as DH anon; the cryptographic
algorithms negotiated are not considered strong, such as
TLS KRB5 EXPORT WITH DES CBC 40 SHA; cer-
tificates were used that are neither validated certificates
nor self-signed certificates pinned to the destination.
Error messages: The W3C document defines common
error interaction requirements and practices to signal two
classes of errors ordered by increasing severity: warn-
ing/caution messages and danger messages.
Warning/caution messages are intended for situations
when the system has reason to believe that the user may
be at risk based on the current security context infor-
mation, however a determination cannot positively be
made. Danger Messages are intended for situations when
there is a positively identified danger to the user (i.e., not
merely a risk).
A.2 Additional Results
We note additional observations on the positive and
negative characteristics shown by the mobile and tablet
browsers. Note that these findings are not directly
related to the guidelines studies in Section 3.
A.2.1 The Good
The W3C document defines two guidelines that
MUST hold when strong TLS algorithms are negotiated
between a client and a server:
1. No version of the TLS protocol that suffers known
security flaws has been negotiated. At the point of
writing of this document, versions of SSL prior to
SSLv3 MUST NOT be considered strong.
2. A cipher suite has been selected for which key and
algorithm strengths correspond to industry practice.
The “export” cipher suites explicitly prohibited in
appendix A.5 of TLSv11 [4] (RFC 4346) MUST
NOT be considered strong.
To verify the compliance with these guidelines we
conducted two experiments.
SSLv2: We browsed to a website supporting only
SSLv2 from each of the candidate browsers. We found
that all the mobile, tablet and desktop browsers comply
with the first guideline and do not support SSLv2.
Null cipher: The null cipher is one of the prohibited
ciphers in RFC 4346 and one of the most dangerous ci-
phers because it represents the lack of an encrypted com-
munication channel. To test browser compliance with
the second guideline for strong TLS algorithms, we built
a website that supports only the null cipher. We ob-
served that none of the mobile, tablet or desktop can-
didate browsers support the null cipher.3
Discontinuing support for SSLv2 and the null cipher
automatically reduces the probability of cipher down-
grade attacks on the candidate browsers.
A.2.2 The Bad
3We did not test for the support to all the prohibited ciphers (as
given in TLSv11 [4]) by the candidate browsers.
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Mobile and Tablet SSLv2 Null cipher Weak cipher
Browsers not supported? not supported? prohibited?
(See Table 1 for versions) (DES-CBC-SHA)
Android · · ×
Blackberry Mango · · ×
Blackberry Webkit · · ×
Chrome Beta · · ·
Firefox Mobile · · ·
iPhone Safari · · ×
Nokia Browser · · ×
Opera Mini · · ·
Opera Mobile · · ·
Windows IE Mobile · · ·
Safari on iPad 2 · · ×
Android on Galaxy · · ·
Table 9: Results of the support for SSLv2, the null cipher and DES-CBC-SHA (weak cipher). The symbol notation is
as defined in Table 2.
A browser supporting a weak cipher can enable a net-
work attacker to break the encrypted messages offline.
The SSLv3 cipher-suite consists of certain weak ciphers,
although they are stronger than the SSLv2 ciphers and
the null cipher. We verified the support of the DES-CBC-
SHA weak cipher. We observed that six (Android Mo-
bile, Blackberry Mango and Webkit, iPhone and iPad2
Safari and Nokia) out of the eleven mobile and tablet
browsers support the weak cipher. The other mobile and
tablet browsers display error messages conveying the ab-
sence of a common encryption protocol with the server.
It is interesting to note that the the Safari browser in its
mobile, tablet and even desktop versions supports this
weak cipher. However, the Android tablet browser does
not support this cipher, unlike its mobile version. Since
most mobile and tablet browsers do not allow users to
see the cipher used on a TLS connection, they can not
determine that a weak cipher is being used. No desktop
browser other than Safari supports this cipher.
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